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The Signaling Effect of Durations between 
 Equity and Debt Issues*  
  
 
BY PAWEL BILINSKI AND ABDULKADIR MOHAMED 
 
 
This study examines whether durations between equity and debt offerings allow 
investors to identify firms that are more likely to time issues of overvalued securities. 
We show that firms with higher stock overpricing are more likely to quickly issue both 
seasoned equity and debt following the previous capital acquisition. Investors 
understand issuers’ incentives to quickly return to the capital market and react less 
favorably to equity and debt issues that follow shortly after the previous offering. 
Together, the results show that durations between equity and debt issues provide 
valuable signals to investors on whether the issuer is likely to be timing the market.  
 
Keywords: seasoned equity and debt offerings, market timing, duration analysis, 
announcement effect. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades, a large body of research has examined why companies raise external 
financing and the trade-off between equity and debt financing (Marsh, 1982; Jalilvand and Harris, 
1984; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1990; Jung et al., 1996; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Hovakimian, 2004; 
Leary and Roberts, 2010; DeAngelo et al., 2010). However, previous studies do not explore whether 
durations between equity and debt offerings signal the motive for the issues, e.g. whether a short 
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duration between consecutive offerings signals that the company is timing the issue of an overvalued 
security. If a short duration between offerings reveals the intent to time the market, investors will 
react less favorably to equity and debt issues that follow quickly from the previous offering. This 
study fills the gap in the literature by examining (1) whether stock overpricing affects durations 
between equity and debt offerings, and (2) whether durations between equity and debt offerings 
impact the price reaction to equity and debt issue announcements.   
Using a sample of 4,598 equity issues and 8,983 debt issues over the period 1975–2008, we 
first examine how stock mispricing affects durations between equity and debt issues. We use the Cox 
(1972) proportional hazard model to investigate durations. Multivariate analysis shows that higher 
stock overpricing accelerates seasoned equity and debt issues. Specifically, high positive abnormal 
returns accelerate both the first seasoned equity offering after the IPO, and all subsequent seasoned 
equity issues. Further, stock overpricing shortens durations to the first debt issue after the IPO, and 
accelerates all subsequent debt issues.1 Together, duration regressions confirm that stock overpricing 
affects the time between seasoned equity and debt issues. 
The duration analysis results reveal that the time between offerings can help investors 
understand the purpose of the issue. Specifically, firms with a higher level of stock overpricing are 
more likely to quickly issue equity and debt following the previous capital acquisition. This evidence 
suggests that investors should react more unfavorably to equity and debt issues that follow closely 
from the previous offering, as these offerings are likely to be timing the market. Consistent with this 
proposition, we find a negative price reaction of −3.296% for equity offerings made within one year 
of the IPO, but −1.532% for equity issues made at least two years after the IPO. Comparable results 
are present for equity issues subsequent to the first equity offering after the IPO. We find similar 
                                                          
1 The evidence that equity overpricing predicts the time to a debt issue is consistent with the findings in Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) and Bradshaw et al. (2006) that stock overpricing has a positive association with the likelihood of 
a debt issue. 
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evidence of a positive relation between debt announcement returns and durations between debt 
issues. To illustrate, the abnormal price reaction to the first debt offering made within a year of the 
IPO is not statistically different from zero, however, the abnormal price reaction to debt offerings 
made at least two years after the IPO equals 2.88%. 
The positive relation between the price reaction to equity and debt issue announcements and 
durations between equity and debt offerings also persists in the multivariate analysis. Specifically, 
controlling for standard measures of stock overpricing, we document that durations between equity 
and debt issues have an incremental power in explaining equity and debt issue announcement 
returns.2 Together, our results demonstrate that (1) short durations between equity and debt 
offerings indicate that firms are more likely to be timing offerings of overvalued securities and (2) 
that investors mark down prices of stocks that issue seasoned securities quickly following the 
previous offering.  
This study makes two important contributions to the literature on seasoned equity and debt 
issues. First, it adds to the fledgling literature that examines durations between external capital 
acquisitions.3 Specifically, we show that firms with higher stock overpricing are on average more 
likely to quickly issue seasoned equity or debt following the previous capital acquisition. Thus, the 
results of this study will be of interest to investors, both institutional and individual, whose wealth 
may be affected by the timing of the firm’s decision to issue equity or debt.  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to document that the timing of 
equity and debt issues from the previous offering signals issuer quality and that investors respond 
less favorably to equity and debt issue announcements that follow quickly from the previous 
offering. This result adds important new evidence to the literature that examines the signaling effects 
                                                          
2 The regressions also control for other predictors of announcement day returns and include proxies for information 
asymmetry, stock liquidity, leverage, return volatility, cash holdings, firm growth options and investments. 
3 We review this literature in Section 2. 
4 
 
of equity and debt issue announcements (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Asquith and Mullins, 
1986; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Gomes and Phillips, 2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, and Section 3 
describes the duration model. We describe the data and present the descriptive statistics in Section 4. 
The duration analysis results are in Section 5. Section 6 presents evidence on the relation between 
the price reaction to announcements of equity and debt issues and the time between consecutive 
offerings. We conclude in Section 7.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews past research on the relation between stock mispricing and the equity 
and debt issue decision. We also review studies that examine price reactions to equity and debt issue 
announcements. 
The market timing model (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) predicts 
that firms take advantage of periodic stock mispricing to issue overvalued equity. This is because 
less-than-rational investors do not revise the stock valuation downwards in the face of the 
information revealed on the equity issue announcements. Jegadeesh et al. (1993) document that 
higher stock returns after the IPO increase the likelihood of firms returning to the capital market 
within three years of the IPO, consistent with investor sentiment about the firm enticing managers 
to quickly return to equity markets. Survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001) provides further 
support for the market-timing explanation for equity issues. They report that 67% of surveyed CFOs 
stated that the amount by which a stock was undervalued or overvalued was an important 
consideration when issuing new equity. Qian (2005) examines durations between seasoned equity 
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offerings starting from the firm’s IPO and finds that the recent stock return performance and future 
growth opportunities affect the time between equity issues.4  
 Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection model predicts a negative price reaction to equity 
issue announcements as the announcement signals that the stock is more likely to be overvalued. 
Consistent with this prediction, studies generally find a negative price reaction to equity issue 
announcements. Korajczyk et al.  (1992) examine 1,285 equity issues over the period 1974–1983 and 
document a mean announcement date abnormal return of −2.94%. A more recent study by Heron 
and Lie (2004) finds a similar magnitude of the announcement day return to equity issues.  
The evidence for timing of debt issues is mixed. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) find that 
firms issuing seasoned debt underperform over the five-year post-issue period, which they attribute 
to managers’ ability to time the market. Bradshaw et al. (2006) document a negative relation between 
annual returns and net debt issues, which they claim reflects that firms time debt issues to periods 
where the stock is temporarily overpriced. However, Dichev and Piotroski (1999) do not find 
evidence of abnormal performance following debt issues, and Elliott et al. (2008) find that fairly-
valued or undervalued firms are more likely to issue debt than equity. Thus, the question on whether 
equity mispricing affects debt issue decisions requires further tests.  
An early study by Dann and Mikkelson (1984) reports a significantly negative price reaction 
to debt issue announcements. However, subsequent studies generally conclude that there is no 
significant price reaction to debt issue announcements (Chaplinsky and Hansen, 1993; Jung et al., 
1996; Howton et al., 1998). The latter evidence is consistent with the Myers and Majluf (1984) model 
that the risk of mispricing is lower for corporate debt compared to equity, and that debt offerings do 
not signal stock overpricing.  
                                                          
4 Our study differs from Qian (2005) as we focus on the signalling effect of durations between equity and debt issues. 
Specifically, our emphasis is on examining the relation between the price reaction to announcements of equity and debt 
issues and the duration between the offerings.  
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Overall, previous studies find consistent evidence that firms issue seasoned equity following 
strong price appreciations and that investors react negatively to equity issue announcements. 
However, it is unclear how stock mispricing affects firm propensity to issue debt. We extend static 
predictions on the relation between stock mispricing and equity and debt offerings into a dynamic 
framework. Specifically, we propose that relative stock overpricing entices companies to issue equity 
shortly after the previous offering. Consequently, we expect equity issues that follow shortly after 
the previous offering to experience more negative price reactions at issue announcements. We leave 
open the sign of the relation between overpricing and the time to a debt issue, and the sign of the 
relation between the price reaction to a debt issue announcement and the time between a debt issue 
and the previous offering.  
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL PREDICTING THE TIME BETWEEN OFFERINGS 
We model the time between seasoned equity and debt offerings using a non-parametric 
proportional hazard model. Shumway (2001, 103) points out that “Hazard models are preferable to 
static models both theoretically and empirically”. This is because unlike static binary models, hazard 
models (1) explicitly account for the time from the previous capital transaction, (2) incorporate time-
varying covariates, and (3) can include macro-economic variables that are identical for all firms at a 
given point in time. Further, we examine separately the time (1) between the IPO and the first 
seasoned equity and debt issue, and (2) the time between consecutive seasoned offerings. This is 
because factors affecting the time between seasoned issues are likely to differ between the first 
seasoned offering after the IPO and subsequent offerings. 
Assuming T is a random variable measuring the time between the IPO and the first equity or 
debt issue, the hazard function is defined as: 
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 
t 0
|
( ) Lim
P t T t t T t
h t
t            (1) 
where h(t) is the hazard rate (i.e. the equity or debt issue rate) and P is the conditional probability of 
a firm issuing debt or equity within a short period of time between t and t +∆t, given that the firm 
has not issued equity or debt up to time t. The hazard function measures the instantaneous rate at 
which a firm issues equity or debt conditional on not having issued up to time t. To illustrate, the 
hazard rate for an equity or a debt issue at t=2 measures the probability that a firm will issue equity 
or debt during the next period, conditional on not having issued up to t=2.  
We choose the non-parametric proportional hazard model, namely the Cox (1972) model, 
because the hazard curve for the duration to an equity or a debt issue can have an irregular shape, 
i.e. it could be monotonically increasing, but then decreasing over time. The hazard model also 
corrects for right-censoring of observations, producing consistent estimates of the time between 
equity and debt issues.5 Specifically, we estimate the following hazard model: 
0( : ) ( )exp( )     j j jh t X h t X         (2) 
where t is either (1) the time to the first seasoned equity or debt issue after the IPO, or (2) the 
duration between consecutive seasoned offerings for firm j. X is a vector of explanatory variables 
that we present in detail in the next sections, and hj(t: X) is the hazard rate conditional on the set of 
explanatory variables X. hj0(t) is the baseline hazard, which is given no particular parameterization 
and is left un-estimated. In other words, no assumptions are made about the shape of the hazard 
rate over time.6 βj are the model parameters estimated through a partial likelihood function. A 
positive β coefficient on a covariate X implies that an increase in the covariate accelerates the time to 
                                                          
5 See Shumway (2001), Hensler et al. (1997) and Espenlaub et al. (2012) for a more detailed discussion of the differences 
between hazard and static predictive models.  
6 The Cox (1972) model has no intercept because the intercept is subsumed into the baseline hazard hj0(t). 
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an equity or a debt issue. A negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the covariate decelerates 
the time to an offering.  
   
MEASURES OF STOCK MISPRICING 
We use three variables to capture stock mispricing and investor sentiment about a stock. 
BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold 
returns on the stock and on the value-weighted CRSP market index measured over six months 
ending 30 days prior to the seasoned equity or debt issue. Internet Bubble is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the equity or debt issue occurs during the internet bubble period (1999–2000), and is 
zero otherwise. Investor “irrational exuberance” during the internet bubble period may have 
motivated companies to accelerate their equity issues. For subsequent seasoned equity and debt 
issues, we also calculate abnormal returns before the previous seasoned offering, Lag BHAR. 
Investors may be reluctant to purchase new securities of firms where high price run-up before the 
previous offering suggests the firm may had been timing the market, which can delay the new 
offering. 
 
CONTROLS 
We classify the control variables into six groups, measures of (1) information asymmetry and 
issuer quality, (2) stock liquidity, (3) leverage and return volatility, (4) cash holdings, (5) firm growth 
opportunities and investments, and (6) macroeconomic variables and other controls. 
 
Information asymmetry and issuer quality 
Three variables capture information asymmetry and issuer quality. We use firm market 
capitalization (MV) to capture the level of information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
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investors. Collins et al. (1987) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) show that firm size captures the 
quality of the firm’s information environment. Low quality information environment should imply 
high information asymmetry.7 Market capitalization is the product of the stock price and the number 
of shares outstanding. An indicator variable for venture capital backed IPOs (VC-back) captures 
better quality issuers. Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry et al. (1990) find that IPOs backed by 
venture capitalists perform better after the issue compared to non-VC backed IPOs. They attribute 
this result to higher quality of VC-backed issuers. Seasoned equity issues may also serve as an exit 
route for VC firms (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011), which can shorten the time between equity 
offerings. We control for public vs. private placements of securities (Private Placement). Private 
placements allow managers to mitigate the negative consequences information asymmetry has on 
public equity issues (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), allowing firms to more quickly raise capital. 
Further, Gomes and Phillips (2012) find that the effect of asymmetric information on the choice of 
public vs. private issue is higher for equity than debt issues.  
Stock liquidity 
We expect durations between seasoned equity and debt issues to be shorter for more liquid 
stocks. This is because high stock liquidity should facilitate share placing with investors, in particular 
with institutional investors. Rubin (2007) and Bilinski et al. (2012) show that equity issues are more 
common among more liquid stocks and that equity issues attract new institutional investors. We use 
firm share turnover (TR), which is the ratio of the number of shares traded over the number of 
shares outstanding to captures the frequency of trading in a firm’s stock.8 Further, we use the 
Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs, Gibbs transactions cost, to capture the 
                                                          
7 Consistent with this prediction, Bhushan (1989) show that larger firms have higher analyst following. Roulstone (2003) 
argues that higher analyst coverage associates with lower information asymmetries.  
8 Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that higher turnover stocks have less information asymmetries. Thus, stock turnover 
can also partially capture information asymmetries. 
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stock’s cost-per-trade.9 Hasbrouck’s (2009) horserace of four effective transaction cost measures 
shows that Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs clearly dominates other cost measures.  
Further, Goyenko et al. (2009) find that Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs has the highest 
annual cross-sectional correlations with effective and realized spreads calculated from the TAQ data 
compared to other spread proxies. 
Leverage and return volatility 
Firms with above-target (below-target) leverage may decide to speed up equity (debt) issues 
to adjust their capital structure towards the target. To calculate deviations from target leverage, we 
use industry-adjusted firm leverage ratios (Leverage ind_adj). Specifically, Leverage ind_adj is the ratio of 
long term debt over total assets less the industry median leverage ratio. We use the return standard 
deviation measured over six months ending 30 days prior to an equity or a debt issue (VOL) to 
capture stock return volatility. Merton (1974) shows that high variation in stock returns reduces the 
market value of debt, which should discourage debt issues when volatility is high.  
Cash holdings 
High cash reserves should reduce firm propensity to quickly issue new securities as 
companies can cover their financing needs from internal sources. However, cash-rich firms may 
decide to issue debt to reduce agency costs as interest and principal payments act as a disciplining 
mechanism that can limit the overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986). To capture the financing gap 
and agency costs, we use the industry-adjusted ratio of cash holdings to total assets (Cash ind_adj). 
Further, we control for the issue proceeds because larger offerings should take longer to prepare and 
may be more difficult to place with investors. Thus, durations between capital transactions should be 
longer for larger offerings. Specifically, Proceeds are total issue proceeds from the current equity or 
debt issue divided by firm total assets. We also include a control for proceeds from the past offering, 
                                                          
9 We obtain data on Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs from Joel Hasbrouck’s website: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jhasbrou/Research/GibbsCurrent/gibbsCurrentIndex.html  
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Lag Proceeds, as firms are unlikely to quickly return to the capital market following a large previous 
offering. 
Firm growth opportunities and investments  
Firms can issue new securities to finance profitable growth opportunities when internal 
funds are insufficient to cover the investment outlay (Carlson et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009). We use the 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) to measure growth opportunities, and the ratio of capital expenditures 
to firm total assets (INV) to measure firm’s investment intensity. High market-to-book ratio and 
high capital spending should associate with faster equity and debt issues from the previous offering. 
Macroeconomic variables and other controls 
Previous studies report that macroeconomic conditions affect equity and debt issues (Baker 
et al., 2003; Faulkender, 2005; Doukas et al., 2011). We use seven variables to control for 
macroeconomic conditions. Term spread is the term spread and is measured as the difference between 
the 10-year bond rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate. Higher term spread should increase the 
duration between the IPO and the subsequent debt issue and between consecutive debt issues. 
Mkt_VOL is the market return volatility measured as the standard deviation of monthly returns on 
the CRSP VW index over the six months ending 30 days prior to an equity or a debt issue. We 
expect high market volatility to delay both equity and debt issues.  
We control for crises periods over our sample period: (1) the oil crisis in 1979, (2) the Black 
Monday crash in October 1987, (3) the Asian financial crisis in 1997, (4) the stock market downturn 
in September 2001 following the terrorist attacks, and (5) the recent financial crisis. Specifically, 
Oil_crisis is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for equity and debt issues made in 1979, 
and zero otherwise. Black Monday takes a value of one for equity and debt issues made for one 
month after the Black Monday crash on 19th October 1987, and zero otherwise. Asian Fin. crisis is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one for equity and debt issues made during the one-year 
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period starting in July 1997, and zero otherwise. September_11 takes a value of one for equity and 
debt issues made in the one year period after the terrorist attack on 11th September 2001. Finally, 
Fin.crisis takes a value of one if the firm issues seasoned debt or equity between 2007 and 2008, and 
zero otherwise. Investor pessimism during crises periods should reduce investor appetite for new 
debt and equity, which can delay these offerings. Our set of controls also includes industry dummies 
(Industry dummies) based on Kenneth French’s twelve industry definitions, and year dummies (Year 
dummies). The basic empirical specification of our duration model is:             
             
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15
( ) ( )exp ln
 _
_ ln
j jh t h t BHAR Internet Bubble MV VC back
Private Placement TR Gibbs transaction cost Leverage ind adj VOL
MCash ind adj Proceeds Lag Proceeds INV Term spread
B
       
  
    16 17 18 1911 3220 21 21 32
1 1
_ _ .
_11 . .     k k
k k
Mkt VOL Oil crisis Black Monday Asian Fin crisis
September Fin crisis Industry dummies Year dummies
   
(3)
 
Market variables and macroeconomic variables are measured 30-days prior to the capital offering 
date. Accounting variables are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the equity or debt issue. To 
avoid hindsight bias, we impose a minimum six-month gap between the fiscal year-end and the 
security issue date when collecting accounting information.  
 
IV. DATA AND SAMPLE 
We collect our sample from the following sources. IPO dates are from Jay Ritter's website 
from 1975 to 2004. Seasoned equity and debt issues over the period 1975–2008 are from the SDC 
New Issues database. We exclude unit offerings, rights issues, pure secondary offerings and offerings 
where the issuer’s primary exchange is outside the US. As in previous studies (Leary and Roberts, 
2005; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003) we exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999) 
and financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999). If a firm issues debt more than once in a year, we 
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include only the first issue. We also follow this approach if a firm issues equity more than once in a 
year.10 Market and accounting data are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively. The final 
sample consists of 4,598 equity issues, of which 1,405 are first seasoned equity issues after the IPO, 
and 8,983 debt offerings, of which 1,598 are first debt issues.  
 Figure 1a shows the annual frequency of 1,405 first issues of equity and of 1,598 first debt 
issues. The annual number of debt issues closely mirrors that of equity issues. Both equity and debt 
issues increase in frequency from around five in 1975 to over 65 in 1983 and 1986, peaking at over 
100 in the early 1990s. Issuing activity slows after the internet bubble and almost disappears in 2008 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Figure 1b repeats the analysis for 3,193 seasoned equity issues 
and 7,385 seasoned debt offerings made after the first seasoned equity or debt issue after the IPO.11 
The number of subsequent seasoned equity and debt issues increases from around 8–11 in 1975 to 
around 60 issues in 1984. Debt issue activity peaks over 1985–1986, reaching over 1,300 issues 
annually. This period coincides with the increase in high-yield bond issues (Kaplan and Stein, 1993; 
Asquith et al., 1989). Equity (debt) issue activity settles at around 78 (287) per year in the 1990s and 
at around 23 (68) in the 2000s.   
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 Table 1 shows the industry distribution of the first equity and debt issues after the IPO and 
of the subsequent seasoned equity and debt issues. Business equipment and health care have the 
largest proportions of both first equity issues (29.5% and 18.2%) and of first debt offerings (14.6% 
and 15.7%). Business equipment and health care also have the highest proportions of subsequent 
                                                          
10 Replicating the analysis using the last offering in a year or average values for all offerings in a year leaves our 
inferences intact. 
11 For ease of exposition, we use “subsequent seasoned equity issues” and “subsequent seasoned debt issues” in the 
reminder of the text to denote seasoned equity and debt issues made subsequent to the first equity or debt offering after 
the IPO.  
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seasoned equity issues (15.8% and 27.9%). For subsequent seasoned debt offerings, chemicals and 
durable consumer goods have the most frequent debt issues (18.8% and 18.5%).  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF DURATIONS BETWEEN EQUITY AND DEBT ISSUES 
We start the empirical analysis by examining the average time between equity and debt issues 
starting from the IPO date.12 Panel A of Table 2 shows the average time between the IPO and the 
first equity or debt issue after the IPO. On average, firms issue a seasoned security 6.504 years after 
the IPO. Firms are faster in issuing seasoned equity than debt after the IPO. The average time 
between the IPO and a first seasoned equity issue is 5.512 years compared to 7.376 years between 
the IPO and a first seasoned debt issue. These findings are consistent with the evidence in Lemmon 
and Zender (2010), who propose that younger firms have more valuable growth opportunities, 
which they are able to exercise only by issuing the relatively more expensive equity. Also, our results 
are consistent with the findings in Helwege and Liang (1996), who report that the first offering after 
the IPO is an equity issue. They attribute this result to small and unpredictable cash flows of young 
firms in the early stages of growth, and greater information asymmetries of these firms due to 
shorter time-series of earnings information, which limits young firms’ ability to access the debt 
market. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
                                                          
12 To calculate durations between equity and debt issues, each IPO firm between 1975 and 1999 is tracked for nine years, 
and IPOs between 2000 and 2004 are tracked at most for 8 years and at a minimum for 4 years. If a firm has not issued 
equity or debt in the nine years after the IPO, the firm is treated as censored. Our conclusions remain unchanged if we 
track IPOs for only five years after the listing and treat IPOs that have not issued equity or debt within five years as 
censored.  
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Panel B of Table 2 reports the average time between subsequent seasoned equity and debt 
issues based on their sequence after the IPO. We make two observations. First, of the 3,193 
subsequent seasoned equity issues in Panel B, only 15% of the firms issued equity seven times and 
more. The corresponding number for seasoned debt issues is 69%. This result suggests that frequent 
equity offerings (of seven times and more) are rare compared to frequent debt issues. Second, the 
average time to a subsequent seasoned equity issue is longer than the equivalent time to a 
subsequent seasoned debt issue (1.186 years vs. 10.6 months). This result is consistent with the 
prediction of the pecking order theory that on average, more established firms issue debt more 
frequently than equity. Together, Table 2 evidence helps explain the mixed evidence on the 
predictive power of the pecking order theory in explaining firm financing choices (Frank and Goyal, 
2003; Fama and French, 2005). Specifically, our evidence suggests that the pecking order theory 
explains financing decision of mature firms, but not of young firms, which may face more difficult 
access to debt markets shortly after the IPO.  
 To shed more light on the external financing patterns, in unreported results, we split 
subsequent seasoned equity and debt issues into (1) consecutive debt issues, i.e. debt issues that 
follow previous debt issues, (2) consecutive equity issues, and (3) interchanging transactions i.e. an 
equity offering that follows a previous debt issue or a debt issue that follows a previous equity issue. 
We observe that the average time between consecutive equity issues is 1.207 years, and 10.7 months 
between consecutive debt issues. For interchanging offerings, the average time to an equity issue 
from a previous debt issue is 1.154 years, and the average time to a debt issue from a previous equity 
issue is 9.2 months. Both values are smaller compared to the average time between consecutive debt 
and consecutive equity issues. This suggests that interchanging offerings can serve to accelerate 
external capital acquisitions.  
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Panel A in Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for our measures of stock mispricing: 
BHAR, Lag BHAR and Internet Bubble. We first discuss the results for the first equity and debt issues 
after the IPO. Mean abnormal return performance prior to the first seasoned equity issue is higher 
than prior to the first debt offering (36.6% vs. 6.3%), and during the internet bubble a slightly higher 
proportion of firms first issued equity than debt after the IPO (5.1% vs. 4.1%). These results suggest 
that stock overpricing is likely to have a stronger impact on equity than debt issues. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the control variables in model (3). Smaller firms are 
more likely to first issue equity than debt after the IPO, and a higher proportion of first equity issues 
are by VC-backed firms (30% vs. 25.7%). The first debt issue after the IPO is more likely to be 
placed with private investors than the first equity issue (35.2% vs. 22.4%). We do not find significant 
differences in stock turnover or Gibbs estimates of transaction costs between first debt and equity 
issues. Consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2001), firms tend to have above target leverage when 
issuing equity, but below target leverage when issuing debt (0.104 vs. −0.097). The variation in stock 
returns is higher before an equity than a debt issue (0.194 vs. 0.155). This result is consistent with 
Merton’s (1974) prediction that high volatility reduces the value of debt, but not of equity, thus 
volatility has a stronger impact on the firm’s propensity to issue debt. Firms have on average higher 
industry-adjusted cash holdings before the first equity than before the first debt issue (0.075 vs. 
0.05), but (asset-scaled) proceeds from debt issues are on average larger compared to equity 
offerings (0.218 vs. 0.125). Looking at Lag Proceeds reveals that first debt issues occur more often 
than first equity issues following large IPOs. The M/B ratio is 2.791 when a firm issues equity for 
the first time after the IPO, and 1.860 for the first debt issue. This result is consistent with Lemmon 
and Zender (2010) that younger firms can exercise their growth options only by issuing the relatively 
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more expensive equity. Capital spending is similar before both first debt and equity issues. There are 
no differences in the term spread and market volatility before the first equity and debt issue after the 
IPO. More firms issued equity than debt after the IPO during the oil crisis (4.10% vs. 1.10%), but 
during the recent financial crisis first debt issues were more frequent than first equity offerings after 
the IPO (4.10% vs. 1.90%).  
 Column Subsequent issues in Table 3 repeats descriptive statistics for equity and debt offerings 
made subsequent to the first seasoned offering after the IPO. The sign and significance of 
differences in firm characteristics for subsequent offerings are similar to those for the first offerings 
after the IPO. However, for subsequent seasoned offerings, there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of stocks that issued equity and debt during the internet bubble, and equity issues tend to 
follow more often when the firm’s leverage is below the industry average. Subsequent seasoned 
equity issue were on average more likely than debt offerings during the recent financial crisis period. 
Finally, we document that Lag BHAR is larger for equity than debt issues (41.5% vs. 15.7%), which 
suggests that seasoned equity offerings are more likely if the previous offering experienced larger 
pre-issue abnormal returns.13  
 
DURATION ANALYSIS: THE FIRST SEASONED ISSUE AFTER THE IPO 
Table 4 presents results from model (3) predicting the time to the first equity and the first 
debt issue after the IPO. A strong price run-up before the issue shortens the duration between the 
IPO and the first seasoned equity (coeff. 0.057) and debt issue (coeff. 0.074). Further, we find that 
during the internet bubble period, companies exploited high investor sentiment and issued both 
                                                          
13 In unreported results, we calculate Pearson correlations between the variables in Table 3. The correlations are on 
average low, with the highest correlation between log M/B and log firm size of −0.368. Consequently, there is no 
evidence that our results can be influenced by multicollinearity. 
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equity and debt quickly after the IPO (coeff. 0.391 and 0.362). Together, duration results confirm 
our prediction that stock overpricing speeds up external capital acquisitions after the IPO.  
Looking at the control variables, we find that large firms with more liquid stocks and lower 
cost of stock trading are faster to issue equity after the IPO. This result is in line with the prediction 
that low information asymmetry and high stock liquidity facilitate equity placements with investors 
(Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Rubin, 2007; Bilinski et al., 2012).14 Lower stock transaction costs also 
facilitate debt placements with investors (coeff. −0.187). Firms backed by a venture capitalist are 
faster to issue both equity and debt after the IPO (coeff. 0.313 and 0.277), consistent with better 
quality issuers being able to quickly return to capital markets after the IPO.15 Public equity offerings 
are quicker than private equity placements (coeff. −0.391). Above-target leverage delays both new 
equity and debt issues (coeff. −0.275 and −0.225). This result supports the prediction that firms are 
unlikely to quickly issue equity to adjust leverage downwards towards the target, but use debt 
offerings to adjust the leverage ratio upwards towards the target level.16 Low cash holdings and high 
capital spending increase the speed of both equity and debt issues, consistent with cash-starved and 
investment-intensive companies relying more on external financing to cover their financing needs 
(Huang and Ritter, 2009). High term spread speeds up equity issues (coeff. 0.298), and firms are less 
likely on average to quickly issue both equity and debt during crisis periods. The latter evidence is 
consistent with the prediction that (1) low investor sentiment during crisis periods reduces investors’ 
willingness to participate in new seasoned offerings delaying firms’ ability to tap into capital markets 
(Korajczyk and Levy, 2003), and (2) that negative market shocks lower value of new investment 
                                                          
14 In untabulated results, we use Liu’s (2006) standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero-trading volume days over 
the prior 12 months in place of stock turnover. The conclusions from using Liu’s (2006) measure are the same as from 
using stock turnover.  
15 The need to quickly return to the capital market may also reflect the VC firms need to liquidate their investments 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Metrick and Yasuda, 2011).  
16 The reluctance to use equity issues to quickly adjust the leverage downwards towards the target may reflect that equity 
issues lead to a wealth transfer from equity- to debt-holders (Hovakimian et al., 2001).  
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opportunities and of assets in place (Choe et al., 1994), which delays new offerings as companies 
wait for market conditions to improve. 
Together, results in Table 4 confirm that security overpricing and high market sentiment 
speed up durations between the IPO date and the first seasoned equity and debt issue. This evidence 
suggests that the time to the first seasoned issue after the IPO can provide a valuable signal to 
investors on whether the issuer is likely to be timing the market. 
 
DURATION ANALYSIS: SUBSEQUENT SEASONED OFFERINGS 
This section presents hazard model results for equity and debt issues subsequent to the first 
seasoned offering after the IPO. Compared to Table 4, duration regressions now also control for 
abnormal returns before the previous seasoned equity or debt issue, Lag BHAR. This is because a 
firm may have to delay a debt or an equity issue if investors suspect the firm may have previously 
attempted to time the market. Further, we include in regressions controls for the type of security the 
firm issued previously. Specifically, Previous debt issue dummy (Previous equity issue dummy) equals one if 
the firm issues equity (debt) following a previous debt (equity) offering. We control for the type of 
security the firm issued previously, because companies may strategically interchange between equity 
and debt offerings to shorten the time between consecutive capital acquisitions. Finally, we include a 
control for the number of offerings a firm made since the IPO, #_offerings_since_IPO. Longer history 
of offerings could provide investors with additional information regarding issuer quality and the 
issue motive.17 The specification of the duration model for subsequent seasoned offerings is: 
                                                          
17 In untabulated results, we find that the sample means for Previous debt issue dummy and Previous debt issue dummy are 3.3% 
and 2.15%, respectively, and the average number of offerings since the IPO is 12. 
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Table 5 show results for model (4) that examines durations between subsequent seasoned 
issues. We continue to find that the recent stock price run-up shortens the time to both seasoned 
equity and debt issues (coeff. 0.125 and 0.163). This result suggests that more seasoned issuers also 
take advantage of “windows-of-opportunity” to speed up issues of both equity and debt. This 
evidence complements the results for the first seasoned offerings after the IPO in Table 4. The 
negative coefficients on Lag BHARs for both equity and debt issues (coeff. −0.018 and −0.076) 
suggest that companies that attempted to time offerings of overvalued securities in the past have to 
wait longer before they can return to capital markets to raise new financing. This evidence suggests 
that investors learn about quality of issuers over time and may be less willing to participate in 
offerings of firms that previously were likely to be timing the market. Finally, as in Table 4, we find 
that high investor sentiment during the internet bubble period prompted firms to quickly issue 
seasoned equity (coeff. 0.795).  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Looking at the control variables, we document that the coefficient on Previous debt issue dummy 
is positive (coeff. 0.135), but it is negative for Previous equity issue dummy (coeff. −0.488). This result 
shows that interchanging the type of security a firm issues shortens the time to an equity offering, 
but not to a debt issue. We find that the number of offerings the firm made since the IPO has a 
negative effect on both the time to equity and debt issues (coeff. −0.055 and −0.117). As external 
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financing is costly, frequent issues may reflect past attempts to time the market, which can 
discourage investors from participating in new offerings leading to longer gaps between capital 
acquisitions.  
Similar to results in Table 4, high capital spending and stock liquidity, low cash reserves and 
VC-backing shorten the time to both subsequent seasoned debt and equity issues. Also, firms on 
average have to delay equity and debt issues during crisis periods. Contrary to results in Table 4, we 
find that smaller firms are quicker to issue both subsequent seasoned equity and debt (coeff. −0.138 
and −0.333) compared to larger firms. This result may reflect that smaller firms suffer most from 
shortage of internal capital and need frequent access to capital markets to finance their investments. 
Further, the evidence that smaller firms issue debt more quickly may also reflect that, due to their 
riskiness, they can only issue short-maturity debt that requires frequent refinancing (Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001). We find that both public offerings of equity and debt are quicker than private 
security placements (coeff. −0.182 and −0.909). Similar to results for the first equity issue after the 
IPO, firms are slow to adjust above-target leverage ratio by issuing equity (coeff. −0.251), but 
deviations from target leverage do not affect how quickly firms issue new debt. Together, this 
evidence suggests that for frequent issuers, equity and debt issues do not serve as a means to quickly 
adjust firm capital structure towards the target level. This result is consistent with the findings in 
Fama and French (2002) that firms take long to adjust their capital structure to the target level. 
High stock return volatility increases the time to both equity and debt issues (coeff. −1.208 
and −0.708), and large debt offerings take longer to prepare, which explains the negative coefficient 
on Proceeds for debt issues (coeff. −0.164). Also, larger proceeds from the previous seasoned issue 
delay the subsequent equity and debt offerings (coeff. −0.103 and −0.251). The coefficient on log 
market-to-book ratio is positive and significant for both equity and debt issues (coeff. 0.265 and 
0.485), which is consistent with firms accelerating external capital acquisitions in the presence of 
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valuable growth options. Finally, contrary to results in Table 4, term spread does not explain the 
time between equity, but high market volatility accelerates equity issues (coeff. 0.417).     
To sum up, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 suggests that firms are quick to issue both 
seasoned equity and debt when the stock is likely to be overvalued. This means that investors should 
react more unfavorably to equity and debt issues that follow closely from the previous offering, as 
these issues are likely to be timing the market. We test this proposition in the next section. 
 
VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MARKET REACTION TO EQUITY AND 
DEBT ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND DURATION BETWEEN OFFERINGS 
In this section, we test the prediction that shorter durations between equity and debt 
offerings have a negative association with the price reaction to seasoned equity and debt issue 
announcements. We calculate daily abnormal returns around announcements of equity and debt 
issues as the difference in the return on stock i on day t (Rit) and the return on the value-weighted 
market index (RMt), it it tAR R RM  . We cumulate abnormal returns for each stock over the 
period starting two days before the issue announcement and ending two days after the 
announcement, 
2
2
i it
t
CAR AR  . We use the SDC database to identify the equity and debt issue 
announcement dates. If the announcement date is missing, we use the filing date.18 The five-day 
window ensures that our results are less likely to be affected by data errors in announcement dates 
compared to using shorter windows.   
 Table 6 reports average abnormal returns around announcements of equity and debt issues 
for offerings made within one year of the previous issue (Quick issues), offerings made between one 
and two years of the previous issue (Medium issues), and offerings made two years and longer from 
                                                          
18 Numerous empirical studies use the filing date as a proxy for the announcement date, e.g. Jegadeesh et al. (1993), 
Denis (1994), and Datta et al. (2005). 
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the previous issue (Slow issues). Panel A reports results for first equity and debt issues after the IPO. 
We observe an increasing trend in abnormal returns as we move from the portfolio of quick to slow 
equity issues. The mean abnormal price reaction to equity issue announcements is −3.296% for 
quick equity offerings, −2.333% for medium equity issues, and −1.532% for slow issues. The 
difference between the mean price reaction to quick vs. slow equity issues is significant at 1% level.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 For first debt issue announcements after the IPO, the pattern in price reactions is similar to 
that for first equity issues. CARs for quick issues are 0.318%, 1.880% for medium issues and 2.880% 
for slow issues. As before, the difference between the average price reaction to quick vs. slow debt 
issues is significant at 1% level. These results show more favorable reactions to slow as opposed to 
quick debt and equity issues after the IPO.   
 Panel B repeats the analysis for seasoned equity and debt issues subsequent to the first 
offering after the IPO. We observe similar trends as for first equity and debt issues. Specifically, 
CARs for quick seasoned equity issues are −3.945%, zero for medium issue and positive 1.442% for 
slow issues. As in Panel A, we continue to find that the price reaction to quick seasoned equity 
issues is statistically more negative compared to slow equity issues. For subsequent debt issues, the 
abnormal price reaction at the issue announcement is zero for all durations, and there is no 
significant difference in the price reaction to quick vs. slow seasoned debt issues. Together, Table 6 
results suggest that on average investors see through the incentives firms have to issue equity and 
debt quickly after the previous offering and react unfavorably to offerings that follow shortly from 
the previous issue.  
 
 
24 
 
PRICE REACTIONS TO SEASONED EQUITY AND DEBT ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENTS: 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
Next, we examine if durations between equity and debt issues have an incremental 
information effect on stock prices controlling for other firm characteristics associated with the 
announcement date stock returns. Specifically, we regress abnormal price reactions to equity and 
debt issue announcements on an indicator variable for slow equity and debt issues (Slow issue dummy), 
which takes a value of one  for offerings made two years or longer from the previous issue, and is 
zero otherwise. We expect to find a positive coefficient on the Slow issue dummy, consistent with the 
prediction that investors react more positively to equity and debt issues that do not follow quickly 
from the previous offering as these offerings are less likely to be timing the market. 
The set of explanatory variables in the price reaction regression includes variables from 
Table 4 that we use to predict durations between equity and debt offerings, as these variables capture 
the intent for an equity issue (e.g. market timing or the need to raise financing to pursue profitable 
growth opportunities), information asymmetry and issuer quality, as well as market conditions and 
firm risk. Consequently, these variables should help explain the price reaction to equity and debt 
issue announcements. Further, we control for the number of offerings since the IPO (# offerings since 
IPO) as investors may react more negatively to new equity issue announcements when the firm made 
fewer offerings in the past, since there is less information on issuer quality available to the public. 
We include an indicator variable for hot issue periods, Hot, which takes a value of one if the number 
of equity and debt issues in a month is above the median monthly number of debt and equity 
offerings in the previous 12 months. We expect more negative price reactions to new issue 
announcements in hot issue periods. Finally, we include industry-adjusted firm age, age ind_adj, which 
is calculated as the difference between the equity or debt issue year and the firm founding year less 
the industry median firm age. More mature firms have a longer time-series of financial information, 
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which can reduce the information asymmetries between the firm and investors and consequently the 
negative price reaction to equity issue announcements (Zhang, 2006).19 The specification of our 
price reaction regression model is:   
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where CAR is the five-day abnormal return around the equity or debt issue announcement. We pool 
first equity and debt offerings after the IPO with subsequent offerings since the univariate results in 
Table 6 suggests that durations between seasoned offerings are important in explaining price 
reactions to both first and subsequent offerings.20   
 Table 7 shows regression results for the price reaction model (5). Consistent with the results 
in Table 6, we find highly significant positive coefficients on Slow issue dummy for both equity and 
debt issues (coeff. 0.010 and 0.011), which indicates that slow offerings elicit a more favorable price 
reaction at equity and debt issue announcements. This result confirms that in a multivariate setting, 
durations between seasoned issues contain incremental information on whether the issuer is likely to 
be timing the market.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
Looking at control variables, we find that abnormal returns before the offering correlate 
positively with the price reaction to equity and debt issue announcements (coeff. 0.004 and 0.020). 
This result is consistent with Asquith and Mullins (1986), Duca (2011), Doukas et al. (2011) and 
                                                          
19 In untabulated results, we find that the sample average for hot issue periods and for firm industry-adjusted age are 
74.6% and 7.945, respectively.  
20 Because we estimate model (5) for a pooled sample that includes first equity and debt issues, we exclude Lag BHAR 
from the regression as this variable is not defined for first seasoned offerings.  
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Dutordoir and Hodrick (2012), who find significant positive coefficients on pre-announcement 
abnormal stock returns when regressed on the price reaction to announcements of seasoned equity 
and debt issues.21 Price reactions to debt issue announcements are on average lower during hot issue 
periods (coeff. −0.022). Hot issue periods include on average more over-priced debt offerings 
(Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999), which can explain average price mark-downs in these periods. 
Smaller firms have more positive price reactions at equity and debt issue announcements, which 
indicates that these firms rely more on external financing to cover their investment needs (Lemmon 
and Zender, 2010). There is a negative coefficient on Gibbs estimate of stock transaction costs for 
equity issues (coeff −0.004), which reflects that higher cost of stock trading increases the difficulty 
of placing shares with investors (Rubin, 2007; Bilinski et al., 2012). High stock turnover lowers price 
reactions to debt issue announcements, which likely reflects lower benefits of debt compared to 
equity financing when stock turnover is high. Cash-rich firms and larger offerings have more 
favorable price reactions at equity and debt issue announcements, which suggests that investors 
perceive these characteristics as signaling better firm prospects. In particular, larger offerings can 
associate with more information disclosure by the firm to facilitate the placement, which can 
temporarily reduce adverse selection costs.22 We find similar results for large past debt offerings 
(coeff. 0.005). Consistent with results in Jung et al. (1996) and Walker and Yost (2008), investors 
react more favorably to equity and debt announcements by firms with intensive capital spending 
(coeff. 0.005 and 0.013), and debt issue announcements elicit higher price reactions for growth 
stocks (coeff. 0.011). Finally, price reactions to equity and debt issue announcements are on average 
                                                          
21 Dutordoir and Hodrick (2012) build on the adverse selection model in Lucas and McDonald (1990) and propose that 
high abnormal returns before the issue announcement capture the extent profitable investment opportunities explain the 
offering decision. In particular, high price run-up can signal low adverse selection costs, leading to a more favorable 
reaction to the issue announcement. 
22 In untabulated results, we include an industry-adjusted measure of the issue proceeds in model (5) in lieu of the firm-
level value of the issue proceeds. The coefficients on the industry-adjusted proceeds for equity and debt issue price 
reaction regressions are not significant. This result likely reflects that it is the variation in the issue size between firms, 
not within an industry, that offers a valuable signal to investors on the issuer quality. 
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lower in crisis periods. This result is consistent with the predictions in Choe et al. (1993) that periods 
of economic turmoil associate with higher adverse selection costs and, consequently, more negative 
reactions to external financing announcements. Overall, the regression results for controls are 
consistent with past evidence.    
To gauge the contribution of duration between equity and debt offerings at explaining the 
variation in the price reaction to equity and debt issue announcements, we re-estimate equation (5) 
without the Slow issue dummy. In unreported results, we find that the Slow issue dummy increases the 
adjusted R-squared in model (4) by 13.4% for equity issues (from 15.7% to 17.8%) and by 10.4% for 
debt issues (from 18.3% to 20.2%). This evidence suggests that durations between offerings have 
substantial economic power to explain price reactions to equity and debt offering announcements.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines whether stock overpricing affects durations between equity and debt 
offerings, and if durations between equity and debt issues impact the price reaction to equity and 
debt issue announcements. We show that firms with higher stock overpricing are more likely to 
quickly issue equity and debt following the previous capital acquisition. Investors understand firms’ 
incentive to quickly return to the capital market and react less favorably to equity and debt issues 
that follow shortly from the previous offering. Together, our evidence shows that durations between 
equity and debt issues signal the issue intent and that investors discount this information in the stock 
price at the equity and debt issue announcements. 
Our findings are important for companies, fund managers, investors and regulators. First, 
our study highlights that investors are concerned with potential stock overpricing affecting the 
durations between equity and debt offerings, and react negatively to offering announcements that 
follow quickly from the previous capital acquisition. This finding suggests that firms should consider 
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durations between offerings when planning their external capital acquisitions— delaying offerings 
can lead to more favorable price reactions at issue announcements. Second, our evidence that stock 
mispricing shortens durations between offerings has important implications for fund managers and 
investors. Specifically, our findings suggest that investors should be cautious when participating in 
security offerings that follow closely from previous issues as these offerings are likely to be driven by 
temporary stock overpricing. Finally, our findings are important for regulators, such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, in that increasingly shorter durations between capital acquisitions can 
signal temporary market overpricing. Regulators could then introduce measures aimed at reducing 
market mispricing, for instance, by imposing a minimum duration between consecutive capital 
acquisitions. 
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Figure 1a: The distribution of first seasoned equity and of first seasoned debt issues after the IPO. 
Figure1b: The distribution of seasoned equity and debt issues subsequent to the first seasoned equity 
and debt offering after the IPO. 
Figure 1: Sample distribution 
Figure 1a shows the distribution of first seasoned equity and debt issues after the IPO. Figure 1b shows the distribution 
of seasoned debt and equity issues excluding the first seasoned offering after the IPO.   
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Table 1: Industry distribution of seasoned debt and equity issues 
 
 
First equity  issues  after IPO First debt  issues  after IPO 
 
Subsequent equity  issues Subsequent debt  issues 
 
Number % of all Number % of all 
 
Number % of all Number % of all 
Non-durable consumer goods 55 3.9% 104 6.5% 
 
112 3.5% 815 11.0% 
Durable consumer goods 70 5.0% 105 6.6% 
 
156 4.9% 1364 18.5% 
Manufacturing 82 5.8% 145 9.1% 
 
201 6.3% 256 3.5% 
Energy, oil and gas 50 3.5% 118 7.4% 
 
254 7.9% 1003 13.6% 
Chemicals 53 3.8% 100 6.3% 
 
148 4.6% 1390 18.8% 
Business equipment 415 29.5% 233 14.6% 
 
503 15.8% 352 4.8% 
Telecommunication 56 4.0% 105 6.6% 
 
223 7.0% 595 8.1% 
Retails 166 11.8% 172 10.8% 
 
248 7.8% 358 4.8% 
Health care 256 18.2% 251 15.7% 
 
892 27.9% 318 4.3% 
Other industries 202 14.4% 266 16.6% 
 
456 14.3% 935 12.7% 
Total 1405   1598   
 
3193   7385   
 The table shows industry distribution of seasoned equity and debt issues. First equity issues after IPO shows the number of first seasoned equity issues after the IPO. First 
debt issues after IPO shows the number of first seasoned debt issues after the IPO. Subsequent equity issues shows the number of seasoned equity issues subsequent to the 
first seasoned offering after the IPO. Subsequent debt issues shows the number of seasoned debt issues subsequent to the first seasoned offering after the IPO. Column 
Number shows the number of offerings and % of all shows percentages for the corresponding column. Row Total shows the overall number of seasoned equity and debt 
issues. We use Kenneth French industry definitions to allocate firms into industries. 
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Table 2: Durations between equity and debt issues 
 
 
Equity and debt issues  Equity issues  Debt issues 
Issue sequence since the IPO # of issues 
Time from 
the previous 
issue 
# of issues 
Time from 
the previous 
issue 
# of issues 
Time from 
the previous 
issue 
Panel A: First issue after the IPO 
     
1st issue 3003 6.504 1405 5.512 1598 7.376 
Panel B: Seasoned equity and debt issues subsequent to the first seasoned equity and debt offering after the IPO 
2nd issue 1809 0.672 1191 1.129 618 0.831 
3rd issue 1181 1.501 558 1.448 623 0.981 
4th issue 861 0.458 477 1.004 384 0.016 
5th issue 657 0.689 271 0.564 386 0.737 
6th issue 482 0.707 211 1.119 271 0.399 
7th issue and more 5588 2.135 485 1.850 5103 2.331 
Average Time   1.027   1.186   0.882 
Panel A shows the time (in years) to the first seasoned equity and to the first seasoned debt issue after the IPO. 
Panel B shows the time between seasoned issues subsequent to the first offering after the IPO. Equity and debt 
issues shows results for the pooled sample. Equity issues shows results for equity issues, and column Debt issues 
shows results for debt offerings. Issue sequence since the IPO shows the sequence of the offering since the IPO. # of 
issues shows the number of seasoned offerings. Time from the previous issue shows the average time between the 
offerings. Row Average Time shows the average time between subsequent seasoned offerings. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables 
 
   First issue after the IPO Subsequent issues 
      Equity issue Debt Issue Diff t-test Equity issue Debt Issue Diff t-test 
Panel A: Measures of stock mispricing 
 
     
BHAR 36.60% 6.30% 30.30% 10.518 38.00% 11.20% 26.80% 9.765 
Lag BHAR 
 
   
41.50% 15.70% 25.80% 10.110 
Internet Bubble  5.10% 4.10% 0.90% 1.762 3.90% 4.70% −0.80% −1.645 
Panel B: Control variables 
 
       
MV 844.250 1425.500 −581.24 −6.786 883.720 2801.990 −1918.270 −7.674 
VC-back 30.10% 25.70% 4.40% 1.862 30.20% 24.10% 6.10% 1.883 
Private Placement 22.40% 35.20% −12.8% −7.712 22.70% 38.30% −15.60% −7.158 
TR 1.247 1.471 −0.224 −1.112 1.369 1.348 0.021 1.067 
Gibbs transaction cost 0.096 0.094 0.002 1.002 0.057 0.095 −0.038 −1.171 
Leverage ind_adj 0.104 −0.097 0.201 2.851 −0.106 0.040 −0.146 −2.231 
VOL 0.194 0.155 0.039 1.876 0.200 0.144 0.056 1.967 
Cash ind_adj 0.075 0.050 0.025 1.723 0.080 0.016 0.064 2.034 
Proceeds 0.125 0.218 −0.093 −2.171 0.143 0.253 −0.110 −2.765 
Lag Proceeds 0.144 0.251 −0.107 −5.142 0.213 0.313 −0.100 −6.176 
M/B 2.791 1.860 0.931 7.654 2.509 1.573 0.936 4.291 
INV 0.072 0.071 0.001 0.450 0.072 0.074 −0.002 −0.212 
Term spread 0.002 0.003 −0.001 −0.987 0.003 0.005 −0.002 −1.021 
Mkt_VOL 0.046 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.045 0.005 0.001 
Oil_crisis 4.10% 1.10% 3.00% 1.671 5.50% 2.14% 3.36% 1.775 
Black Monday 5.70% 3.80% 1.90% 1.145 5.43% 6.01% −0.58% −1.117 
Asian Fin. crisis 5.10% 4.67% 0.43% 1.178 6.25% 4.56% 1.69% 1.244 
September_11 1.80% 1.10% 0.70% 0.667 2.80% 1.44% 1.36% 1.102 
Fin.crisis 1.90% 4.10% −2.20%  −3.712 4.10% 1.80% 2.30% 4.002 
N 1405 1598     3193 7385     
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The table shows mean values of the explanatory variables for the model predicting the time to a seasoned equity or debt issue. BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return 
calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold return on the stock and the value-weighted CRSP market index measured over six months ending 30 days prior to the 
seasoned equity or debt issue. Lag BHAR is the BHAR calculated for the prior offering. Internet Bubble is a dummy variable that equals one if the equity or debt issue occurs during 
the internet bubble period (1999–2000), and is zero otherwise. MV is firm market capitalization, which is the product of the stock price and the number of shares outstanding. VC-
back is an indicator variable that equals one for IPOs backed by a venture capital firm, and is zero otherwise. Private placement is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm places 
the offering with private investors, and is zero otherwise. TR is share turnover, which is the ratio of the number of shares traded over the number of shares outstanding. Gibbs 
transaction cost is the Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs. Leverage ind_adj is the industry-adjusted firm leverage ratio, which is the ratio of the firm’s long 
term debt over total assets less the industry median leverage ratio. VOL is the return standard deviation measured over six months ending 30 days prior to the equity or debt issue. 
Cash ind_adj is the industry demeaned ratio of cash holdings over total assets. Proceeds are total issue proceeds from the current equity or debt issue divided by firm total assets. Lag 
Proceeds are asset-scaled proceeds from the previous offering. M/B is the market-to-book ratio. INV is the ratio of capital expenditures over firm total assets. Term spread is the term 
spread measured as the difference between the 10-year bond rate and the three-month Treasury. Mkt_VOL is the market volatility measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
returns on the CRSP VW index over six months ending 30 days prior to equity or debt issue. Oil_crisis is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for equity and debt issues 
made in 1979, and is zero otherwise. Black Monday is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for equity and debt issues made for one month after the Black Monday crash on 
19th October 1987, and is zero otherwise. Asian Fin. crisis is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for equity and debt issues made during the two year period starting in July 
1997, and is zero otherwise. September_11 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for equity and debt issues made in the one year period after the terrorist attack on 11th 
September 2001. Fin.crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm issues seasoned debt or equity over 2007–2008. We measure accounting variables at fiscal year-end 
preceding the equity or debt issue allowing for a six month reporting gap between the fiscal year-end and the security issue date. Market variables and macroeconomic variables are 
measured 30-days prior to the capital offering. Column First issue after the IPO shows results for the first seasoned equity or debt issue after the IPO. Subsequent issues shows results for 
seasoned equity and debt issues subsequent to the first offering after the IPO. Equity issues shows results for seasoned equity issues and Debt issues for seasoned debt issues. Diff 
shows the difference in mean values for equity and debt issues and t-test is the corresponding t-statistic. N is the number of observations.  
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Table 4: Duration analysis: the time to the first equity and debt issue after the IPO 
 
    First equity issue First debt issue 
       Exp. Sign Estimate t-test Estimate t-test 
BHAR +/? 0.057 1.990 0.074 2.010 
Internet Bubble  +/? 0.391 2.980 0.362 2.550 
ln MV +/+ 0.062 1.620 −0.010 −0.310 
VC-back +/+ 0.313 4.170 0.277 3.490 
Private Placement +/? −0.391 −4.420 0.115 1.640 
TR +/+ 0.524 8.200 −0.091 −1.280 
Gibbs transaction cost −/− −0.150 −3.880 −0.187 −4.820 
Leverage ind_adj +/− −0.275 −2.590 −0.225 −2.510 
VOL −/− −0.044 −0.140 −0.528 −1.360 
Cash ind_adj −/− −0.653 −4.020 −0.683 −3.870 
Proceeds −/− −0.066 −0.370 −0.129 −1.020 
Lag Proceeds −/− −0.132 −1.240 −0.158 −1.550 
ln M/B +/+ 0.065 0.970 −0.006 −0.070 
INV +/+ 0.092 2.340 0.192 5.430 
Term spread +/− 0.298 1.890 −0.231 −1.370 
Mkt_VOL −/− 0.115 0.800 −0.179 −1.170 
Oil_crisis −/− −0.549 −1.800 −1.937 −1.990 
Black Monday −/− −0.453 −3.850 −0.926 −3.610 
Asian Fin. crisis −/− −0.266 −1.770 −0.046 −0.270 
September_11 −/− −0.010 −0.040 −0.535 −1.950 
Fin.crisis −/− −0.644 −5.310 −0.672 −3.360 
Industry dummies   Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 
 
11.2% 13.7% 
N   1405 1598 
The table shows results (Estimate) from Cox (1972) proportional hazard models predicting the time to the first 
seasoned equity issue (First equity issue) and to the first seasoned debt issue (First debt issue) after the IPO. Industry 
dummies and Year dummies are industry and year dummies respectively, and other variables definitions are in Table 3. 
Column Exp. Sign shows the expected sign of the coefficient, and t-test is the t-statistic. Pseudo R2 is the pseudo R-
squared, N is the number of observations, and ln denotes a logarithm. 
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Table 5: Duration analysis: the time to a seasoned equity issue and to a seasoned debt 
issue subsequent to the first seasoned offering after the IPO.  
 
  
Subsequent equity issues 
  
Subsequent debt issues 
  
    
  Estimate t-test Estimate t-test 
BHAR 0.125 4.020 0.163 3.760 
Lag BHAR −0.018 −1.660 −0.076 −1.732 
Internet Bubble  0.795 10.700 0.093 0.440 
Previous debt issue dummy 0.135 2.620 
 
 Previous equity issue dummy 
 
 
−0.488 −5.520 
# offerings since IPO −0.055 −1.671 −0.117 −4.440 
ln MV −0.138 −8.220 −0.333 −9.290 
VC-back 0.201 4.200 0.539 5.450 
Private Placement −0.182 −4.130 −0.909 −7.780 
TR 0.189 5.400 0.337 5.220 
Gibbs transaction cost −0.313 −14.600 −0.127 −2.470 
Leverage ind_adj −0.251 −4.870 −0.032 −0.340 
VOL −1.208 −4.910 −0.708 −1.690 
Cash ind_adj −0.611 −5.390 −0.408 −1.990 
Proceeds −0.108 −1.490 −0.164 −7.800 
Lag Proceeds −0.103 −2.020 −0.251 −2.700 
ln M/B 0.265 5.050 0.485 5.970 
INV 0.264 11.520 0.200 3.970 
Term spread −0.042 −0.480 −0.103 −0.560 
Mkt_VOL 0.417 4.840 0.132 0.680 
Oil_crises −0.835 −2.640 −0.612 −1.050 
Black Monday −0.370 −3.980 −0.681 −2.630 
Asian Fin. crises −0.101 −0.920 −0.658 −2.580 
September_11 −0.552 −3.770 −0.064 −0.180 
Fin.crisis −0.842 −9.050 −1.134 −4.280 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 20.3% 22.1% 
N 3193 7385 
The table shows results (Estimate) from Cox (1972) proportional hazard models predicting the time to a seasoned 
equity issue subsequent to the first seasoned offering after the IPO (Subsequent equity issues) and the time to a 
seasoned debt issue subsequent to the first seasoned offering after the IPO (Subsequent debt issues). Previous debt issue 
dummy (Previous equity issue dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm issues equity (debt) following a 
previous debt (equity) issue. # offerings since IPO is the number of offerings made by the firm since the IPO. Industry 
dummies and Year dummies are industry and year dummies respectively, and other variables definitions are in Table 3. 
t-test is the t-statistic, Pseudo R2 is the pseudo R-squared, and N is the number of observations.  
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Table 6: The relation between abnormal returns around announcements of equity and 
debt issues and durations between equity and debt issues: univariate results.  
 
 
Equity issues  Debt issues 
 
N CAR(−2,2) t-test N CAR(−2,2) t-test 
Panel A: First equity and debt issues after the IPO 
Quick issues 43 −3.296% −3.830 548 0.318% 0.387 
Medium issues 373 −2.333% −2.066 289 1.880% 1.780 
Slow issues 989 −1.532% −3.769 761 2.880% 2.216 
t-test: quick vs. slow issues 
 
−2.431 
 
−2.611 
Panel B: Equity and debt issues subsequent to the first offering after the IPO  
Quick issues 152 −3.945% −6.201 236 0.459% 1.515 
Medium issues 438 0.214% 1.431 1798 0.259% 1.267 
Slow issues 2603 1.442% 1.894 5351 0.291% 1.086 
t-test: quick vs. slow issues   −2.674 
 
1.574 
The table shows cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of equity and debt issues for offerings made 
within one year of the previous issue (Quick issues), offerings between one and two years of the previous issue 
(Medium issues), and offerings made two years and longer from the previous issue (Slow issues). Panel A reports results 
for the first equity and debt issue after the IPO. N is the number of offerings, CAR(−2,2) is the percentage market-
adjusted cumulative abnormal return in a five-day window starting two days before the issue announcement and 
finishing two days after the announcement. t-test is the t-statistic. Equity issues shows results for equity offerings 
and Debt issues for debt offerings. t-test: quick vs. slow issues is the t-test for the difference in mean abnormal returns 
between Quick issues and Slow issues. Panel B repeats the analysis for seasoned equity and debt issues subsequent to 
the first offering after the IPO. 
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Table 7: Regression analysis of the relation between durations between equity and 
debt issues and abnormal returns around announcements of equity and debt issues. 
 
  Equity issues  Debt issues  
    
  Estimate t-test Estimate t-test 
Intercept 0.114 3.540 0.062 1.740 
Slow issue dummy 0.010 4.150 0.011 4.780 
BHAR 0.004 1.770 0.020 4.100 
Internet Bubble  −0.009 −0.960 −0.015 −1.610 
Hot −0.023 −1.511 −0.022 −2.770 
ln (1+age ind_adj) 0.001 0.330 0.001 0.700 
# offerings since IPO 0.001 1.560 −0.005 −1.430 
ln MV −0.005 −1.650 −0.002 −1.990 
VC-back 0.007 1.240 0.006 1.370 
Private Placement  0.010 1.570 0.001 0.360 
TR 0.002 0.360 −0.007 −1.960 
Gibbs transaction cost −0.004 −1.790 −0.001 −0.350 
Leverage ind_adj −0.003 −0.330 −0.009 −1.290 
VOL 0.019 0.810 −0.050 −1.590 
Cash ind_adj 0.048 2.190 0.028 1.970 
Proceeds 0.033 2.170 0.011 3.550 
Lag Proceeds 0.001 0.010 0.005 2.730 
ln M/B 0.003 0.690 0.011 1.960 
INV 0.005 2.420 0.013 4.900 
Term spread 0.002 0.220 0.002 0.250 
Mkt_VOL −0.012 −0.850 −0.009 −1.210 
Oil_crisis −0.007 −0.440 −0.012 −0.740 
Black Monday −0.015 −1.640 −0.011 −2.260 
Asian Fin. crisis −0.011 −0.770 −0.018 −1.080 
September_11 −0.026 −2.820 −0.003 −0.040 
Fin.crisis −0.003 −0.300 −0.019 −4.680 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Adj R2 17.8% 20.2% 
N 4598 8983 
The table shows results (Estimate) from regressions of the price reaction to equity (Equity issues) and debt (Debt 
issues) offerings announcements on an indicator variable for slow equity and debt issues. The dependent variable 
is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return in a five-day window starting two days before the issue 
announcement and finishing two days after the announcement. Slow issue dummy takes a value of one for offerings 
made two years and longer from the previous issue, and is zero otherwise. Hot is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if the number of equity and debt issues in a month is above the median monthly number of debt 
and equity offerings in the previous 12 months, and is zero otherwise. age ind_adj is the industry-adjusted 
difference between the equity or debt issue year and the firm founding year. # offerings since IPO is the number of 
offerings made by the firm since the IPO. Industry dummies and Year dummies are industry and year dummies 
respectively, and other variables definitions are in Table 3. t-test is the t-statistic, Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared, 
N is the number of observations, and ln denotes a logarithm. The sample includes all seasoned equity and debt 
issues. 
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